The Verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) is traditionally considered a realist-correspondist model to explain the proximity of our best scientific theories to the way things really are in the world out there (ʻthe Truthʻ, with the capital ʻtʻ). However, VS is based on notions, such as ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ, that dilute the model in a functionalist-like theory. My thesis, then, is that VS tries to incorporate notions, such as ʻprogressʻ, in a pre-constituted metaphysical conception of the world, but fails in providing a fitting framework. The main argument that I will develop to support this claim is that the notions that they use to explain scientific progress (ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ) have nothing to do with ʻthe Truthʻ. After presenting Cevolani and Tamboloʻs answer (2013) to Birdʻs arguments (2007), I will claim that VS sacrifices the realist-correspondist truth in favor of an epistemic notion of truth, which can obviously be compatible with certain kinds of realism but not with the one the authors have in mind (the correspondence between our theories and the way things really are).
Introduction and structure of the paper
The history of verisimilitude started in 1960, with Karl Popper's qualitative definition of 'truthlikeness.' As a realist and admirer of [author's first name] Tarski's conception of truth, Popper was looking for a notion of truth that could bear the idea that as our scientific theories are continuously rebutted by other scientific theories, perhaps there was more there than just the notion of falsity at work. The last abandoned theories were false, but in a certain sense 'closer to the truth' than the former. Popper attempted to model his theory of 'truthlikeness' on Tarski's concept of truth: for every language L, the actual world divides its sentences into true sentences and false sentences (Tarski 1969 ). Popper's idea, then, was that scientific theories should have bivalent truth values in the correspondence sense: if A and B are closed classes of statements in L (scientific theories), B is closer to T (the set of all true sentences) if implies more truths and fewer falsities than A.
In 1974 two independent milestone papers by [author's first name] Tichý (1974) and [author's first name] Miller (1974) exposed severe problems for this approach, especially when it comes to explain false theories being 'more truthlike' than other theories (either true or false). After these papers, much work has been done to provide a notion of 'likeness' and to improve the semantics and the formalization of the intuition first conceived by Popper. [Author's first name] Niiniluoto (1984 Niiniluoto ( , 1999 , [author's first name] Miller (1978) , [author's first name] Oddie (1986) , and [author's first name] Kuipers (1987 Kuipers ( , 2000 developed postPopperian theories of verisimilitude. Though the supporters of VS do not constitute a philosophical school characterized by absolute unanimity
• 1) a false theory can constitute a genuine instance of progress when it replaces a less verisimilar theory;
• 2) a method is fixed to assess which, among two competing theories, is closer to the truth.
These tenets "form the hardcore of a full-blown realist and fallibilist theory of scientific progress" (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 923) .
In order to provide a clear formulation of my thesis, in the next paragraph I will clarify what kind of 'realism' the notion of Verisimilitude is meant to capture. Obviously enough, other conceptions of realism are possible, and some are even presented here, but it is crucial to have in mind that my claims are oriented exclusively towards the particular correspondence sense that [author's first name] Cevolani, [author's first name] Tambolo, and [author's first name] Bird (as Tarski and Popper before them) seem to have in mind. That is, the idea that our scientific theories should try to correspond to 'the way things really are in the world out there', or 'the Truth', as I will call it in what follows. With that in mind, I will argue that the notion of 'estimated progress', which is crucial for VS, is unfitting for the work it is supposed to do in the model. In other words, the model doesn't reach its declared goal.
In 2007 Alexander Bird published a paper entitled "What Is Scientific Progress?" This paper re-proposed a vision of scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge as well as discussing both the 'semantic approach' and the 'functional-internalist approach'. Focusing on his critique of the semantic approach (as he calls VS) and the replies, in the third paragraph I will discuss some interesting consequences. I present Bird's challenges to VS, along with Cevolani and Tambolo's distinction between 'real' and 'estimated' progress. I go on to expand the claim concerning the connection between real progress and VS, in order to make it clearer where my arguments are heading.
In the fourth section, I analyze the procedures to estimate the truth and point out deep similarities between VS and some functionalist theories. As I have already admitted, epistemic notions of truth can be compatible with certain kinds of realism, but my arguments are directed towards the realist models, not realism in general. Both VS and Bird's model are conceived to clearly distance themselves from such functionalist theories, but I argue fail to do so.
In the fifth section, I will extend the remarks regarding Bird's 'accumulating model' and show the similar problems that the notion of 'approximate truth' shares with VS's 'estimated truth'. I finish by arguing that the specific kind of correspondist realism that these authors have in mind entails that reality is constitutively unknown, and that this fact is the source of the difficulty encountered in characterizing the models as realist correspondist tools. Some concluding remarks will follow.
The target: realist-correspondist models
A preliminary clarification is needed. Both Bird and VS supporters have in mind something that the word 'realism' alone could hide: the intuition of an independent and determined reality which our knowledge could correspond to, i.e. the Tarskian concept that Popper was thinking of when he first conceived the notion of verisimilitude; there is a genuine problem here, since other philosophers intend 'realism' differently. Let me be clear: a disquisition about what realism is -or what it should be -is beyond the purposes of this paper. What is aimed at here is solely specific realist models held by VS. However, I must underline that there is a distinction between two patently different uses of the word 'realism'. The Spanish philosopher Zamora Bonilla proposed (1992; a 'methodological version' of VS, within which verisimilitude is fully understood in an epistemic fashion., In his model, there is no space for the duality between objective and apparent closeness to 'the Truth'. It is crucial to notice the difference: "my own approach is 'realistic' because I do want to explain just what it means our supposition that the objects investigated by science are 'real and objective'" (Zamora Bonilla 1992, p. 365) . He is convinced, though, that "truth as absolute correspondence with transcendental facts cannot take place in any way" (ibid., p. 366). Therefore, 'truthlikeness' in his view "must not be understood as a combination of information and Tarskian truth, as Popper and Niiniluoto maintain" (ibid., p. 367).
Much could be said about this ambiguous usage², but as I said above, this is not my concern here. I just want to discuss the Tarskian, correspondist side of VS -which remains overwhelmingly predominant in the field. My arguments, then, are specifically oriented towards the realist-correspondist models that use VS to handle notions such as 'progress', 'knowledge', etc.
Bird's critique of the verisimilitudinarian approach
Let me take a step back. It is useful to introduce, at this point in the paper Bird's critique of the traditional verisimilitudinarian approach. This is important because the latest versions of VS, formulated -among others -by Niiniluoto (1987; 1998) and Cevolani & Tambolo (2013) , are at least partially an answer to arguments very similar to those elaborated by Bird (2007) . In this way, we will be in a privileged position to understand the direction taken by the recent realist-correspondist models that make use of VS: particularly, we will see that they have been forced in a certain (undesirable for them, as I claim) direction.
Bird's aim is to rehabilitate the conception of progress as accumulation of knowledge (the 'cumulative conception'). He complains that verisimilitude has become in the last years the privileged weapon against anti-realists' relativisms. Even Popper, he believes, "somewhat forlornly, hoped that his adherence to verisimilitude would differentiate him from his anti-realist contemporaries" (Bird 2007, p. 66) . Bird is convinced, on the contrary, that 'increasing knowledge' is a more fitting candidate to defend realists' claims. Consider the following thought experiment, part of one of his arguments against VS (which he calls 'the semantic view'):
Imagine a scientific community that has formed its beliefs using some very weak or even irrational method M, such as astrology. But by fluke this sequence of beliefs is a sequence of true beliefs. These true beliefs are believed solely because they are generated by M and they do not have independent confirmation. Now imagine that at time t an Archimedes-like scientist in this society realises and comes to know that M is weak. This scientist persuades (using different, reliable methods) her colleagues that M is unreliable. [...] The scientific community now rejects its earlier beliefs as unsound, realising that they were formed solely on the basis of a poor method. On the semantic view this community was making progress until time t (it was accumulating true beliefs) and then regressed (it gave up those beliefs). (Bird 2007, p. 67) This clearly does not adhere to our intuition: scientific progress is not merely an acquisition of beliefs, even if they are by chance true. VS reconstruction lacks of interest in the issue of the grounding of scientific beliefs in the evidence. Cevolani and Tambolo's answer is accurate in showing how VS survives this objection. Bird's example is directed at accounts of progress as accumulation of true beliefs: but this is not the case with VS. Consider this passage by Cevolani and Tambolo: Let us recall the distinction between real and estimated progress. Such a distinction is motivated by the fact that there is no way to ascertain whether a given belief exhibits a genuine correspondence to 'the real world': progress, construed as real progress, is something to which we have limited epistemic access. […] within VS the step from a theory T to a theory T' is considered as progressive if and only if the verisimilitude of T' is estimated higher than the verisimilitude of T on the basis of the available evidence: progress, construed as estimated progress, is something to which we do have epistemic access. (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 928 ).
The move is clear: in Bird's example, even if real progress is achieved, there is no estimated progress. VS sticks to our intuitions when it claims that progress begins with the acknowledgment of the unreliability of the theory M. The price to pay to escape the criticism, however, is steep: "real progress and estimated progress do not necessarily go hand in hand" (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 929) . However, having avoided this difficulty anther one arises: what is the relation between estimated progress and real progress?
The answer we are given is not entirely convincing: Cevolani and Tambolo, in order to emphasize the role of informativeness in VS, underline that verisimilitude is understood as a combination of accuracy and content. Bird's attack, they claim, is directed at an account of progress as accumulation of approximate truths (accuracy) and adds to the recipe another ingredient; informativeness (content). For example, if we want to determine the height of Monte Bianco (h=4810m) to learn how long will it take for us to climb it, theory A which claims that 'h' is between 2000 and 8000 m is accurate, but very uninformative for us; whereas theory B which claims that 'h' is between 4600 and 4800 m -though less accurate (because technically wrong), is much more informative for us. On Bird's view this would be considered progress in our knowledge because B's verisimilitude is higher. All true theories are maximally approximately true, but they could have different degrees of verisimilitude, depending on their informativeness. In other words, there is a difference between accumulating truths (or approximate truths) and approaching 'the Truth': "verisimilitude […] is closeness to the whole truth" (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 930) . This, however, is convincing only if we think strictly of the internal coherence of the theory: but what happens when we want the model to tell us something about the world? Of course, knowing from the beginning the height of Monte Bianco, it is easy to see which theory is more 'approximate' to the truth. But this is a fiction: if we know that the height is 4810 m, we don't need to discuss the verisimilitude of A and B! The real question, the one we are confronted with, is another one: what happens when we do not know the height?
Estimating the truth
The question is simple: how can we establish the verisimilitude of two competing theories without knowing 'the Truth'? If verisimilitude is a combination of accuracy and content, and we do not know the level of accuracy of the two competing theories, it seems that we can't measure verisimilitude in a meaningful way.; All we are given is 'estimated progress.' Scientific inquiry is thus seen as "an endeavour aimed at the search for theories which, given the available evidence, can reasonably be considered, at least for the time being, the most verisimilar among the alternatives". The estimated verisimilitude is then "a fallible but reliable indicator of genuine progress towards the truth" (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 927) . How could estimated verisimilitude be a reliable indicator of genuine progress if we never get to know if the progress is real or not? It seems there is a genuine problem here.
Niiniluoto himself admits that "for a true Popperian, concepts like expected verisimilitude and probable approximate truth are of course not very appealing" (Niiniluoto 1998, p. 20) . Nevertheless, VS is considered by supporters and non-supporters as a theory which handles notions such as 'progress' or 'knowledge' in a realist-correspondist manner. What we have seen so far indicates that this doesn't seem true. Of course, 'the Truth' is the constant reference of VS supporters, but this realist-correspondist notion does not have even a small role in the model. My claim is that VS is a model that can be used by such realists, but not only: the metaphysical commitment comes from the outside. Consider this sentence by Niiniluoto: a key feature of the similarity approach is that the concept of truthlikeness is always relative to a target: distance from 'the truth' depends on where your goal is located, and likeness to the goal depends on the respects of comparison that are taken to be relevant. (Niiniluoto 1998, p. 14) How is that related to 'the way things really are out there'? The logical structure of VS proposed by Niiniluoto shows that even more clearly: Niiniluoto, with his 'critical scientific realism', defines a quantitative notion of expected verisimilitude in Bayesian terms: EVS (T | e) = ΣᵢVS (T, Cᵢ) P (Cᵢ | e) (expected verisimilitude of theory T given the evidence e is the sum of the verisimilitude of T in every state of affairs C multiplied by the probability P of every state of affairs given the evidence e). Even if others tried to define the notion of estimated verisimilitude in non-quantitative ways, it is clear that 'the Truth' is for them something like the Beckettian Godot: they always speak about it but it never shows up.
I maintain that Niiniluoto's formula could be accepted even by the so-called 'functional internalists'. Saying that the goal is near to 'the Truth' is just an additional, unverifiable and vague condition. Essentially, all VS says is that we have progress when we adopt a better theory. it is only a supplementary bias -with no grounds -adding that, being better, it is now closer to 'the Truth': there's nothing telling them that.
Cevolani and Tambolo write that expected verisimilitude is "construed as the relevant 'epistemic utility' guiding the acceptance of scientific hypotheses" (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 925) : how can this be, as they say before in the same paper, a "full-blown realist theory of scientific progress" (ibidem, p. 923)? Kuipers, with his 'constructive realism', asserts that "choosing the most successful theory (for the time being) is 'functional for approaching the truth'" (Kuipers 2000, p. 32) . "Psillos", claims Bird, "wants to salvage the notion of verisimilitude since he regards it as being a key implement in the realist's toolbox" (Bird 2007, p. 88 ). Niiniluoto conceives VS as part of his critical realism³ and as a "logical, epistemological, and methodological tool for a fallibilist realist" (Niiniluoto 1998, p. 25) . My claim is that the structure of VS does not characterize the theory as realist-correspondist: it does not have to do with the way objects really are in the world. At this point, one could wonder why the theory must be realist-correspondist: could it not be just a realist theory, broadly intended? After all, not only real progress has something to do with realism. As I have already specified, even an epistemic notion of truth can be compatible with certain kinds of realism. Are we sure that the correspondence of our scientific theories with the real world out there is what Niiniluoto, Cevolani and Tambolo have in mind when they claim that the theory is full-blown realism? I argue that it is.
When Zamora Bonilla published 'Truthlikeness without truth', the reactions by supports of VS were eloquent. "I will contend", wrote Bonilla, "that the (epistemological) notion of 'estimated truthlikeness' is more important than the concept of 'closeness to the absolute truth'; even more: that this last concept can be perfectly excluded from our philosophical perspective" (Zamora Bonilla 1992, p. 345). Instead of having methodological consequences for the theory, the procedure is overturned: it is the success of the theory (with respect to the empirical evidence) that guarantees 'closeness to the truth'. In fact, the 'estimated closeness to the truth' "seems to be reduced to the more instrumentalist concept of 'adequacy to the empirical data'" (ibid., p. 346). Zamora Bonilla has his proper 'methodological' version of VS: verisimilitude is fully understood as an epistemic concept, and the duality between objective and apparent closeness to 'the Truth' has no space in it.
Ilkka Kiema (before known as Kieseppä) critically evaluates Zamora Bonilla's methodological approach. He estimates the metaphysical commitment in the standard interpretation of VS, stating that "when developing this theory, one should rest content with the more modest aim of conceptual analysis, or of providing explications for the relational concept of being closer to the truth" (Kieseppä 1996, p. 421) . He is convinced that VS can be seen as a theory providing us with an explanation of an ordinary-language expression (closer to the truth): "the modest aim of giving a more precise meaning to this unclear way of speaking is quite sufficient for […] the defense of a realist account of scientific progress" (ibid., p. 432). Moreover, Kiema doubts that providing practicable algorithms for comparing competing scientific theories is a realistic aim for VS. This theory, he writes, does not have to yield methodological recommendations. It could be used instead "in a logical reconstruction of the methodology of science: […] it would suffice to show somehow that scientists actually have, when choosing between competing hypotheses, preferred ones for which the value of ver is large. It would be irrelevant from this perspective to observe that proving this is difficult" (ibid., p. 424). Cevolani and Tambolo follow the same route: "the logical problem of verisimilitude amounts to the preliminary definition of an appropriate notion of verisimilitude, allowing for a comparison of any two theories with regard to their closeness to the, supposedly known, truth. The epistemic problem of verisimilitude, on the other hand, amounts to the definition of an appropriate notion of estimated verisimilitude by which the estimated closeness to the unknown truth of any two theories could be compared on the basis of the available evidence" (Cevolani, Tambolo 2013, p.5) .
But how can we be satisfied by a mere logical explanation and formalization of the model? If the reference to 'the Truth' has no role whatsoever in the model, how is VS a translation of Tarski and Popper's first realist-correspondist intuition? If VS is to be taken seriously, we should also think of the model operating within (?)actual scientific theories. We must illustrate what being 'closer to the truth' entails.; We must illustrate if truth (?) is possible; if in our practice this concept is useful; etc. It seems that the metaphysical commitment is just an external, supplementary addition; nothing seems to prove or even indicate that "the theory of truthlikeness might be used for showing that science has progressed towards the truth" (Kieseppä 1996, p. 425) , as Kiema and other VS supporters hold. For example, Oddie openly admits (1986) that 'the Truth' (something stronger that the empirically discernible one) is the aim of inquiry. Niiniluoto, who too stresses the role of 'estimated verisimilitude', considers VS as part of his critical realism, in which the correspondence with 'the Truth' has a key role. Notwithstanding their intentions, however, it seems that their realist-correspondist intuition never succeeded in having a role in the conception of progress. As they describe it, not only is VS not a realist-correspondist model: it is not even a realist one. Niiniluoto's quantitative formula to estimate the verisimilitude of a theory can also function as a useful anti-realist tool to decide which theory is more useful. In VS (?) the role of 'the Truth' is so secondary that I doubt there is a clear sense in which the theory is realist at all.
Accumulating knowledge
Despite his criticism of the concept of verisimilitude, Alexander Bird -who has himself a realistcorrespondist intuition⁴ -proposes a conception of progress as accumulation of knowledge which shares with the former the idea of 'approximate truth'. This notion incurs the same problem ('non-sequitur' of the metaphysical commitment) of VS. This is relevant because it shows how difficult it is to handle notions such as 'progress' or 'knowledge' in reference to 'the Truth'.
Bird asks us to imagine an objection to his conception of progress as accumulation of knowledge: "theories are very often at best only approximately true; they rarely attain full truth. Since knowledge entails full truth, theories cannot be the objects of knowledge" (Bird 2007, p. 83) . If so, we obviously cannot accumulate knowledge. To counter this objection Bird has a strategy. The plan is to define a notion of approximate truth, thanks to which certain propositions, as 'approximately p', will be fully true:
If p is approximately true, then the proposition q, that p is approximately true, is itself true, not merely close to the truth.
[…] Even if p is not true and so not knowable, q (q = approximately p) might well be knowable. (ibid., p. 84) On Bird's view we can say 'p' is not true, but 'approximately p' is fully true. However, I doubt that this line of reasoning is acceptable. If knowledge must entail full truth, we cannot turn an approximate truth -which cannot be an object of knowledge -into a 'full truth' by moving the adjective backwards. The problem (?) is obviously still there. Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that 'approximately p is fully true' is more than a pun, still that adverb makes that truth ambiguous. Instead of a 'real-but-approximate' truth, we would have a 'full-but-vague' truth. I am not sure this is a step forward, but I am positive that it is not what Bird means when he says that 'knowledge must entail full truth'. Being satisfied with such a notion of 'knowledge' is perfectly legitimate however it is not a realist view in the Tarskian sense.
The problem is analogous to the one encountered before. Bird has in mind 'the Truth' as the way things are out in the world. Either our beliefs are true or not but when it comes to show how the independent truth has a role in his conception of progress, we start to encounter adverbs such as 'approximately.' The problem is that there is never a real answer to the question "how approximate"? In the end, the reference is always to our knowledge, and not the world out there. On this view it is always us deciding on pragmatic bases where we expect 'the Truth' to be. No wonder that Bird and VS supporters' conclusions are similar: the reference of their theories do not aim to the 'True world', but must deviate toward an approximate version of it established with methods that are acceptable by functional-internalists or even anti-realists. My point, then, is that nothing in these procedures really distinguishes them as realists; to do so, the definitions "must help us to affirm that the 'correct' interpretation of scientific theories is the 'realist' one" (Zamora Bonilla 1992, p. 358) . It looks like 'the Truth' is always behind the next corner, then we go around it, and there is another corner behind which it is waiting; and so on...
Corresponding to the truth
Cevolani and Tambolo admit: [The] obvious fact that in most interesting cases 'the truth' is simply unknown, so that the estimated verisimilitude of competing theories, not their verisimilitude, is the crucial point of interest for an account of scientific progress. (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 925) We have seen how this fact entails so many problems when it uses the notion of 'approximate truth' in defense of metaphysical conceptions about the world. Bird himself recognizes it: "this milder, realist scepticism that although truth is unobtainable, truthlikeness is achievable, would, if correct, rule out both the cumulative knowledge view of progress and the cumulative truth version of the semantic view" (Bird 2007, pp. 78-79) . Bird does have in mind a way out of this problem., On his view "philosophers of science, […] have been all too ready to accept the premises and indeed conclusion of the pessimistic induction. They have no reason to do so" (ibid., pp. 79-80). His strategy is clear: why should we think that our theories are not strictly correct? The reason is that even many realists accept a weak form of the pessimistic induction, inferring from the premise that all past theories have been falsified to the conclusion that all current and future theories will be falsified also.
[…] For the time being it is worth challenging the premise. There are many venerable scientific propositions that have never been falsified and which we have no reason to suppose ever will be, and which do not state approximations. Here is a sample: blood circulates pumped by the heart, chemical substances are constituted by atoms, water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen, light is electromagnetic radiation, electrons are negatively charged, the speed of light is constant for inertial observers, […] . (ibid., p. 79) There are many problems here. The most obvious is that we rarely have 'reasons to suppose that our beliefs will be falsified', but it happens all the same. At the end of the Nineteenth century, Newton's theory had not been falsified, and there was no reason to suppose it ever would be. (It is a well-known and curious fact that Max Planck was told not to study physics, since everything that there was to discover had already been discovered). Having no reason to suppose a belief will be falsified is not a guarantee it will not be. Another problem, and Bird is aware of this, is that science investigates what we don't know. Therefore, it is unclear how that strategy will help. It is Bird himself who felt the need to introduce the notion of 'approximate truth'. A third problem is that these sentences could indeed, from a realist point of view, state approximations. It is not certain that everything that there is to discover on electrons' charge has been discovered. It is conceivable that in 3015 our 'venerable scientific proposition' will be 'electrons are negatively and x charged', or even 'electrons are not negatively charged'. Of course, in our everyday life we consider these sentences fully true; but in a philosophical and rigorous perspective the scenario is different. It is precisely in Bird's metaphysical perspective that we are never justified saying what he is saying. Scientific theories such as Newton's, Einstein's, 'water-is-a-compound-of-hydrogen-and-oxygen', could be near 'the Truth', but we will never be able to say that they are definitively true. It is our hypothesis as corrispondentists: the 'Truth' is independent of our knowledge. The final, and most(?) general, problem which is related to the latter is that the metaphysical question of the independence of reality has been misunderstood. What is at stake here is not only 'pessimistic induction'. Intending the truth as a correspondence with 'the Real and independent world' is legitimate, but negate on principle our participation to it⁵, even as spectators. Our knowledge of black holes and circulatory system are different only in degree of confidence and success: we believe (and that's not a detail) that the latter is much more accurate, more approximate to 'the Truth'. The principle, though, is the same: what and how they really are has nothing to do with our finite instruments to explore the external world.
To answer Bird's question: the matter is not that 'we think that our theories are not strictly correct.' Rather, from a realist-correspondist point of view, we can never say if they are. That's why 'philosophers of science' say that "there is no way to ascertain whether a given belief exhibits a genuine correspondence to 'the real world'" (Cevolani & Tambolo 2013, p. 928) .
Conclusions
In the first paragraph I have introduced the notions of truthlikeness and verisimilitude; in the second, I have clarified the 'reality' that such notions were meant to capture; in the third, I have presented Bird's challenges to VS and Cevolani and Tambolo's distinction between 'real' and 'estimated' progress; in the fourth, I have analyzed the procedures to estimate 'the truth' and pointed out deep similarities with functionalist theories; in the fifth, I have presented Bird's 'accumulating model' and the similar problems that the notion of 'approximate truth' shares with VS's 'estimated truth'; in the sixth, I have argued that the specific kind of correspondist realism that these authors have in mind entails that reality is constitutively unknown.
In conclusion, the two theories considered (VS and Bird's cumulative conception) do not represent a defense of the realist intuition that they are born to defend (the correspondence to 'the Truth'). These theories are attempts to incorporate notions as 'progress' in a pre-constituted metaphysical conception of the world, but fail in providing a framework capable of bonding the model and the metaphysics.
